

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, JA
SUBJECT: BRIEFING BOOK FOR SECRETARY'S VISIT: US-JAPAN SECURITY
RELATIONSHIP

1. US-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS ARE ON A MORE EVEN KEEL THAN THEY HAVE BEEN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE CONCLUSION OF THE PEACE TREATY IN 1952. THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY, ONCE A POLITICAL FOOTBALL, HAS GAINED GENERAL POPULAR ACCEPTANCE AS AN INTEGRAL AND CRUCIAL ELEMENT IN THE COMPLEX OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN THE US AND JAPAN. IT RECEIVED ONLY PASSING ATTENTION AS AN ISSUE IN THE DECEMBER 1976 GENERAL ELECTION AND, OUTSIDE OF OKINAWA, WAS NOT AN ISSUE IN THE JULY 1977 UPPER HOUSE ELECTION. THE US WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA, DETENTE, OKINAWA REVERSION AND THE GRADUAL REDUCTION AND CONSOLIDATION OF US MILITARY BASES IN JAPAN HAVE ALL CONTRIBUTED TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATY.

2. FOR JAPAN THE TREATY PROVIDES DETERRENT AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK, IN PARTICULAR, AGAINST THE NUCLEAR THREAT, AND PROVIDES A FAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT IN NORTHEAST ASIA. IT ALSO PRECLUDES THE NEED FOR JAPANESE DEVELOPMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL INDEPENDENT MILITARY POWER, WHICH WOULD BE
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DESTABILIZING FOR THE ENTIRE REGION. FOR THE US, THE TREATY PROVIDES ACCESS TO BASES IN JAPAN AND INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES ESSENTIAL FOR THE PROJECTION OF US POWER IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC. JAPAN'S NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING THE USSR AND THE PRC, UNDERSTAND THIS AND ACCEPT, AT LEAST IMPLICITLY, THE CONTINUATION OF THE TREATY RELATIONSHIP. JAPAN SEEKS NO ALTERATION IN THE RELATIONSHIP.

3. IN THIS MORE FAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT, THE GOVERNMENT HAS FOUND IT POSSIBLE TO BRING DISCUSSION OF SECURITY ISSUES INCREASINGLY INTO THE OPEN. LAST YEAR THE US-JAPAN SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE COOPERATION (SDC) WAS ESTABLISHED TO FACILITATE PLANNING IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY. MORE RECENTLY, THE DIET HAS ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE MATTERS.

4. THE TREND TOWARD THE GOJ DOING MORE FOR DEFENSE, HOWEVER, IS GRADUAL. PUBLIC THREAT PERCEPTION REMAINS LOW AND LATENT FEARS OF REARMAMENT AND MILITARISM PERSIST. THE OPPOSITION REMAINS READY TO EXTRACT POLITICAL ADVANTAGE FROM SECURITY ISSUES AND THE GOVERNMENT STILL FINDS ITSELF ON THE DEFENSIVE. MOREOVER, THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF ABOUT 45,000 US SERVICEMEN, PLUS THEIR FAMILIES, CREATE OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS, PARTICULARLY ON OKINAWA, WHERE MORE THAN HALF OF OUR FORCES ARE CONCENTRATED.

5. IN ADDITION TO MAINTAINING ASSURED ACCESS TO BASES IN JAPAN, BOTH IN PEACETIME AND IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY, WE ARE SEEKING TO PERSUADE THE GOJ TO INCREASE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO OUR MUTUAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN TWO AREAS: INCREASED SHARING OF THE COSTS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF OUR FORCES HERE; AND QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN JAPAN'S OWN MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

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6. COST SHARING. JAPAN ALREADY EXPENDS SOME \$130 MILLION ON RENTAL PAYMENTS FOR FACILITIES UTILIZED BY US FORCES. IN ADDITION, JAPAN IS SPENDING APPROXIMATELY \$150 MILLION ANNUALLY TO CONSTRUCT REPLACEMENT FACILITIES FOR THOSE WHICH WE HAVE AGREED TO RETURN TO JAPAN. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT JAPAN SHOULD CONTRIBUTE MORE IN ORDER TO RELIEVE US FROM THE RAPIDLY RISING COST OF THE JAPANESE LABOR FORCE EMPLOYED AT OUR BASES. THESE COSTS HAVE RISEN FROM \$143 MILLION IN 1968 TO \$400 MILLION IN 1975. GIVEN OUR OWN BUDGETARY STRINGENCIES, THESE COSTS COULD AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE PRESENCE IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA UNLESS WE CAN OBTAIN SOME RELIEF FROM THE JAPANESE. WE HAVE ENTERED INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE TO THIS END AND THE JAPANESE HAVE ALREADY INDICATED A RECOGNITION OF THE PROBLEM AND A WILLINGNESS TO HELP AT LEAST IN SOME RELATIVELY MINOR AREAS. THE ASSUMPTION OF CERTAIN DIRECT LABOR COSTS, SUCH AS RETIREMENT BENEFITS, HOWEVER, HAS PROVEN TO BE VERY DIFFICULT IN VIEW OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT AND A MUTUAL DESIRE NOT TO CHANGE IT. WE EXPECT OUR NEGOTIATIONS TO CLIMAX IN NOVEMBER. THE PRESIDENT INDI-

CATED INTEREST IN THE PROBLEM DURING FUKUDA'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN MARCH AND A CONTUNUED MANIFESTATION OF HIGH LEVEL INTEREST ON YOUR PART WOULD HELP.

7. JAPANESE DEFENSE BUILDUP. A NEW DEFENSE PLAN ADOPTED IN 1976 TO GUIDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF DEFENSE FORCES OVER THE NEXT DECADE CALLED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BALANCED PEACETIME "BASELINE FORCE" WITH THE CAPABILITY OF DEALING WITH RATHER LIMITED CONTINGENCIES AND WITH A BUILT-IN MOBILIZATION BASE FOR MODEST EXPANSION IN AN EMERGENCY. IT EMPHASIZED IMPROVEMENTS IN LIGISTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AND AIR DEFENSE, DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES, WHICH THE US HAS QUIETLY ENCOURAGED. HOWEVER, THE GOJ HAS AFFIRMED ITS POLICY TO LIMIT
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DEFENSE SPENDING FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS TO NO MORE THAN LONG STANDING BARRIER OF 1 PERCENT OF GNP, AND THE GOJ BUDGET FOR THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR FALLS SHORT OF EVEN THIS MODEST LIMIT, REPRESENTING BUT .88 PERCENT OF GNP. ALTHOUGH THE OVER-ALL GOJ BUDGET ROSE BY MORE THAN 17 PERCENT, DEFENSE SPENDING ROSE BY LESS THAN 12 PERCENT, AND THE DEFENSE SHARE OF THE BUDGET CONTINUED ITS LONG DECLINE, FALLING BELOW 6 PERCENT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THE GOJ MAY POSSIBLY TO BETTER IN FY 78 BUT YOUR VISIT WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS HIGH-LEVEL US DISAPPOINTMENT IN THIS CURRENT BUDGET, WHICH RAISES SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT JAPAN'S WILLINGNESS TO IMPLEMENT EVEN THE MODEST GOALS OF ITS DEFENSE PLAN.
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